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Across 4 experiments, the authors investigated the role of value instantiation in bridging the gap between
abstract social values and behavior in specific situations. They predicted and found that participants
engaged in more egalitarian behavior (point allocation using the minimal group paradigm) after con-
templating a typical instantiation of the value of equality compared to an atypical instantiation or a
control condition that simply made the value salient. This effect occurred when participants generated
reasons for valuing equality in the instantiation (Experiment 1) and when participants merely read about
hypothetical examples of the instantiation context (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). Results across experiments
indicated that the effect of prior instantiations was not mediated by changes in the abstract value; instead,
the process of applying the abstract value was crucial (Experiment 4). Together, the experiments show
that the process of applying an abstract value to a specific situation can be influenced by seemingly
unrelated prior episodes.
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When your values are clear to you, making decisions becomes easier.
—Roy Disney (2005)
This quotation suggests that values are important guides in life:
When people are clear about their values, they are able to make
decisions with a degree of ease because of the guidance that their
values provide. This notion has been the foundation of a long line
of social psychological research on values, beginning with Allport,
Vernon, and Lindzey’s (1960) classic description of value types
(theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and religious).
Rokeach (1973) later provided an important theoretical and em-
pirical analysis of values, focusing on the general impact of values
across contexts and situations. More recently, Schwartz (1992,
1996) has shown cross-cultural support for motivational conflicts
and compatibilities between diverse values.
Across these programs of study, social values have been re-
garded as abstract trans-situational goals that serve as guiding
principles in people’s lives and represent universal requirements of
human existence, including biological, social, and group survival
goals (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Indeed, values
are distinguished from other psychological constructs, such as
attitudes (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1998) and social norms (e.g.,
Sheeran, Norman, & Orbell, 1999) by their role as important,
prescriptive principles that guide decision making. Supporting this
notion, there is evidence that values guide attitudes and behavior
across diverse contexts (Homer & Kahle, 1988; Maio & Olson,
1994; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1996; see also Olson & Zanna,
1993), while serving as standards by which people can judge the
valence of attitude objects, their own actions, and the actions of
others (Feather, 1995; Rohan, 2000; Verplanken & Holland,
2002). Values can provide this broad guidance across a wealth of
widely differing situations because they are abstract principles or
rules that develop with experience (Rokeach, 1973).
The next step is to explain the processes through which values
influence behavior. To bring a value to bear in a specific situation,
the gap from the abstract representation of the value to the concrete
representation of the situation must be bridged. Specifically, the
situation must be recognized as a potential instantiation of the
general value principle, that is, recognized as the kind of situation
to which the value applies. This task is far from trivial, and the
processes that underlie this bridging between abstract value and
specific situation have not been addressed.
For example, applying the value of equality to a concrete situ-
ation requires first of all that some quantity is recognized as being
potentially unequal. Yet not all inequalities are value relevant, and
most probably are not. Observing two speakers, we may notice that
one is taller than the other, one’s hair is longer than the other’s, one
is more physically attractive, and so on. However, these differ-
ences are not likely to be construed as relevant to the importance
of equality as a value, unless perhaps there are inequalities of
worth or outcome. For example, if one of the two speakers is
awarded surprisingly more applause than the other, we might start
to wonder about the value of equality. At this point, however, the
task of bringing the value to bear has only begun. The crucial
question we face is whether the applause should have actually been
equal. There could be numerous reasons why the differential
treatment is justified (e.g., one speaker was more informative).
Furthermore, other values, such as the need to support the weak or
disenfranchised, could also be relevant and oppose a decision
based on equality in the given context. Indeed, explicit examples
of these difficulties can be found in the complex judicial explana-
tions of legal decisions involving fundamental values and rights,
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whether these be equality, freedom, or the sanctity of life (e.g.,
Conte, Davidson, & Burchill, 2004). By contrast, much value-
guided behavior in day-to-day life may involve tacit mental pro-
cesses. Nevertheless, the same bridging task has to be achieved in
both cases, and there is no prior evidence about the nature of these
mental processes.
Elucidating these processes is necessary for an understanding of
where values are applied and where they are avoided. Individuals
must instantiate a value to be able to relate it to the context in
which it appears, and the specific instantiation within that context
might influence the subsequent application of that value. For
example, without imagining specific negative and positive impacts
of antiterrorism measures on people’s freedom, the value of free-
dom cannot be brought into one’s evaluation of such policies.
Crucially, the abstract nature of values allows them to be in-
stantiated in diverse ways, and this enables people to use or bypass
their values if they are seen to have an ill fit to the situation. For
example, some people view abortion as an instantiation of the
value of sanctity of life, but these same people may not see capital
punishment as instantiating the value (and vice versa). Similarly,
an individual may perceive equality as a requirement to treat
diverse ethnic groups and men and women in the same manner but
fail to perceive equality in the issue of discrimination against
people who differ in other characteristics (e.g., height, weight, or
handedness). The issues surrounding the application of abstract
values to specific behaviors have not been widely recognized in
debates about value-relevant issues. The goal of the present re-
search was to investigate the processes of value application by
examining potential effects from one application context to the
next. Specifically, we examined effects of value instantiations on
subsequent behavior for a different instantiation of that value—a
question that had never been previously examined. Examination of
this question may reveal vital evidence about the nature of value
use.
The Importance of Value Instantiation
Although past evidence has revealed that the contemplation of
conflicting values increases the complexity of reasoning about an
issue (Tetlock, 1986), this research did not directly examine value
instantiation per se. The most pertinent evidence has related to the
effects of elaborate versus nonelaborate value representations on
behavior. Specifically, Maio, Olson, Allen, and Bernard (2001)
found that elaborating the argumentative reasons for a value in-
creased participants’ subsequent pro-value behavior. In one of
their experiments, participants were asked to list reasons for the
value of equality. Next, in an ostensibly distinct study, participants
were asked to allocate points to two teams: their own team and
another team. Despite having received substantial incentives to act
in a discriminatory manner, participants who had considered rea-
sons for the value of equality and rated its importance subse-
quently behaved in a significantly more egalitarian fashion than
participants who had only been given the opportunity to rate its
importance. Moreover, Maio et al. predicted and found that the
elaboration of cognitive support did not affect behavior by increas-
ing the personal importance of the value or by increasing the
accessibility of the value from memory. Instead, they proposed
that the elaboration of reasons for a value helps because it gener-
ates more concrete instantiations. Consistent with this hypothesis,
participants who listed more instantiations of a value (e.g., describ-
ing affirmative action in the workplace) among their reasons
exhibited more pro-value behavior than participants who did not
list such instantiations. This finding provided initial evidence of
the importance of value instantiation for value use. However, the
research did not directly examine effects of different types of
instantiations.
We expected that two equally concrete instantiations within a
context might nevertheless have substantially different subsequent
effects. One such content factor that might moderate the effect of
instantiations is whether these instantiations were typical or atyp-
ical for that value. Typicality is of special relevance because it has
a long history within psychology, in particular cognitive psychol-
ogy, where typicality of instantiation has played a fundamental
role in theories of conceptual structure. Typical instantiations are
generally defined as those that are more accessible in memory as
frequent examples of a concept; they may also be closer to the
central tendency for the concept and closer to ideals (Barsalou,
1987). Research has found that typical instantiations (e.g., robin)
of a concept (e.g., bird) are categorized faster (e.g., Heinze,
Muente, & Kutas, 1998; for a review, see Smith & Medin, 1981)
and are more likely to be mentioned first when participants are
asked to list all members of a category (Battig & Montague, 1969).
Similarly, typical instantiations are verified more quickly and elicit
lower brain activity than atypical instances and nonmembers of a
category (Stuss, Sarazin, Leech, & Picton, 1983). Furthermore,
Rosch (1973) found that typical instances of a category are more
likely to serve as cognitive reference points than atypical instan-
tiations. For example, people are more likely to say that “a raven
[atypical] is like a blackbird [typical]” than to say that “a blackbird
[typical] is like a raven [atypical].” Within social psychology, Lord
and colleagues (e.g., Lord, Desforges, Fein, Pugh, & Lepper, 1994;
Lord, Desforges, Ramsey, Trezza, & Lepper, 1991) provided con-
vincing evidence that typicality of instantiation has an impact on
attitudes and behavior. For example, people are more likely to be
influenced by their social category attitudes in their interactions
with typical category members than with atypical category mem-
bers.
Evidence for a role of typicality in the context of social values
would be important because, until now, the dominant view has
been that values are trans-situational guiding principles that influ-
ence subsequent behavior on a higher level than the individual
situation (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 1992). If this is the
case, the typicality of prior instantiation should not matter, or, with
a more liberal interpretation of this view, different instantiations
would operate through their impact on the emergent properties of
the abstract value, such as its importance and centrality. However,
if the typicality of a value instantiation does affect subsequent
behavior and operates independently of changes in the abstract
principle, it would be clear that the instantiations per se are of
particular importance to theorizing about values and their effects.
This result would be of theoretical importance because it makes
clear that the whole process of value application requires detailed
attention in a way that has not previously been scrutinized (cf.
Seligman & Katz, 1996).
Thus, the primary aim of our research was to test if the typicality
of a value instantiation affects subsequent behavior. This aim is
important by itself because it can be counterintuitive that the
instantiation of a value in one context can affect the application of
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the value in a subsequent, different context. For instance, would
people treat a novel immigrant group more equally after recently
thinking about equality between men and women than after think-
ing about equality between right-handers and left-handers (an
atypical instantiation of the value)? The idea that value-guided
behavior is influenced by previous episodes that differ only in
typicality would seem to have implications for understanding the
rationality of people’s value-based behavior and consequences for
a variety of applied contexts. Consequently, any demonstration of
such an effect is important.
Even though our proposal is counterintuitive in some regards,
there are several ways in which an effect of typicality might occur.
Figure 1 outlines three logically possible pathways. Pathway A
involves a direct impact of the instantiation on the abstract value
and, through that, on behavior; in other words, something about the
value itself, such as its importance or availability, is altered, and
this change affects the subsequent situation. This is the premise of
much of the extant literature. In contrast, Pathway B is a direct
route between situations that does not involve representations of
the value itself. That is, one situation can be used as an analogy for
understanding the next situation, without application of the ab-
stract principle. Consistent with this proposal, studies of cognitive
reasoning have revealed that people often avoid reasoning about
abstractions (e.g., Griggs & Cox, 1982) and prefer to use specific
examples or instances when making judgments (e.g., Johnson-
Laird, Legrenzi, & Sonino-Legrenzi, 1972).
Pathway C is based not on analogical reasoning or on changes
to properties of the value itself but on the process by which the
value is applied to a new situation or behavior (minimal group
discrimination in the current experiments). This process reflects
the spontaneous application of a value to a new situation, inde-
pendent of its accessibility. In theory, typical instantiations of a
value may have a greater chance of eliciting value application
because they are more central in mental representations of the
value than atypical representations. The centrality of the typical
instantiation (e.g., discrimination against women) should make it
more likely that elements of the new situation are processed in
relation to features of the instantiated value concept (e.g., equality)
because spread of activation from the typical instantiation remains
close to the concept. In contrast, spread of activation from the
peripheral, atypical instantiation (e.g., discrimination against left-
handers) would just as easily lead to thinking about unrelated
concepts (e.g., dexterity, sports) as to thinking about the concept
that was used in the instantiation (equality). As a result, it should
be more likely that people spontaneously construe a new situation
in a manner reflecting the value concept after a typical instantia-
tion than after an atypical one (even though the value can remain
important and accessible in both cases).
This emphasis on a role of construal extends Bruner’s (1957)
seminal examination of values and perceptual readiness. From our
perspective, a typical instantiation may make people more percep-
tually ready to see a value in a subsequent situation because typical
instantiations are more central in representations of a concept.
Participants may be more likely to construe a subsequent situation
as being relevant to the value that was given the typical instantia-
tion. The centrality of the typical instantiation may make it more
likely that bottom-up construal will detect features of the subse-
quent situation that make it relevant to the mental representation of
the value as a whole, in the same manner as one can become
perceptually ready to see any category or concept that has been
primed by a typical exemplar.
Overview of Experiments
In the following four experiments, we investigated whether the
typicality of a value instantiation influences behavior promoting
the value. In the first three experiments, participants considered the
value instantiation in what we told them was the first study, and the
effect of the instantiations on their behavior was measured in an
ostensibly separate, entirely unrelated, behavioral decision-making
task. Building on a design used by Maio et al. (2001), Experiment
1 tested whether the contemplation of arguments for and against a
value is more likely to elicit pro-value behavior when people’s
contemplation occurs in the context of a typical instantiation of the
value than in the context of an atypical instantiation of the value.
In contrast, Experiment 2 did not elicit reasons for values but
simply examined the effects of exposure to descriptions of typical
and atypical instantiations of the value. Experiment 3 used differ-
ent typical and atypical instantiations to test the generality of the
effect, and it examined potential influences of associated affective
support and normative pressures on subsequent behavior. Experi-
ment 4 focused more closely on the viability of the analogical
reasoning and value application mechanisms (Pathways B and C).
Together, these experiments fulfilled our primary goal, which was
to determine whether there is a robust effect of typicality in value
instantiations. As a secondary goal, they explored the potential
mechanisms through which this effect may occur (Pathways A, B,
and C).
PATHWAY A 
PATHWAY B 
PATHWAY C 
Value 
Situation 1 Behavior 
Situation 1 Situation 2 Behavior 
Value in 
Situation 2
Situation 1 Behavior 
Figure 1. Potential pathways for an impact of value instantiation on
behavior.
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To establish comparable experimental control, all of the studies
focused on instantiations supporting the value of equality. This
value was selected because of its importance to many social
psychological theories (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988; Tyler, 2000) on a
variety of topics (e.g., justice, prejudice, relative deprivation), its
importance to the most influential models of values (Rokeach,
1973; Schwartz, 1992), and its fundamental importance to the
global discourse about universal human rights (Conte et al., 2004).
Because we wanted to make the instantiations as relevant as
possible, we used pilot testing to select a single situation that had
high perceived relevance to the value of equality and then manip-
ulated typicality within that situation. In the pilot study, 12 par-
ticipants were asked to list situations in which they considered
equality to be important. The most frequently mentioned situation
(10 of 12 participants) involved the workplace and hiring deci-
sions. Consequently, discrimination in the workplace was used as
the focus for both the typical and atypical instantiations of equal-
ity.
Thus, the key feature of each experiment was a manipulation of
the type of example used to instantiate equality in the workplace
context. Each condition therefore had to make salient the value of
equality and the instantiation in which it was being considered. For
example, our first two experiments made salient discrimination
against women in the workplace, whereas the atypical instantiation
focused on discrimination against left-handed people in the work-
place. Immediately after considering an instantiation, participants
gave arguments for and against the value and/or rated its impor-
tance to them. The ideal of equality as a principle applied clearly
to both instances because both sex and handedness are arbitrary
distinctions that should have no effect in the workplace situation
that we identified. If the value of equality is considered as a rigid
guiding principle, then a male candidate should be evaluated using
the same criteria as a female candidate, and a left-handed candidate
should be evaluated using the same criteria as a right-handed
candidate. Although the left-handed/right-handed distinction is
less familiar in this context and is in this sense atypical, handed-
ness is at least as arbitrary a criterion for job selection as gender.
Because the abstract value of equality is highly important to
participants and they see it as highly relevant to the situation, it is
hard to fathom that it would be unacceptable to discriminate
between candidates on the basis of gender but acceptable on the
basis of handedness—the abstract value of equality does not dis-
tinguish between these cases, even though their typicality differs.1
This assumption was supported by data obtained from 20 par-
ticipants in our sample population (i.e., Cardiff University under-
graduates, Cardiff, Wales). They were asked a number of questions
about the typicality (eight items;   .83) and acceptability/
legality of discrimination (three items) based on gender and hand-
edness. Examples include “To what extent do you think gender
(handedness) discrimination is a typical example of discrimina-
tion?”, “How frequently does discrimination against women (left-
handers) occur in the workplace (e.g., at the job interview stage)?”,
and “To what extent do you think it is acceptable to discriminate
on the basis of gender (handedness)?” (The entire set of typicality
items is described in the section on Experiment 4, where the role
of typicality is explored further.) As expected, participants rated
gender discrimination as being more typical than handedness dis-
crimination ( p .001), and virtually all participants regarded both
instances of discrimination as being highly unacceptable/illegal. In
fact, agreement was so high that there was insufficient item vari-
ance to form a reliable index of acceptance/legality across items.
The dependent measure in our experiments was the same as that
used by Maio et al. (2001). This measure assessed intergroup
discrimination in a modified version of the minimal group para-
digm (Tajfel, 1970), which involves participants allocating points
to members of two teams, their own team (e.g., the red team) and
another, opposing team (e.g., the blue team). The groups cited in
our typical and atypical instantiations were not at all implicated in
this measure. Despite this lack of a direct link between our instan-
tiations and the measure, we expected participants’ behavior to
differ following a typical instantiation as opposed to an atypical
instantiation or a control task in which the value was made salient.
Each experiment also explored at least one of the three afore-
mentioned mechanisms for any such effect. As described above,
typicality effects could occur directly at the level of the abstract
concept (Pathway A). If this is the case, then any effect of the
typicality of the instantiation on participants’ subsequent behavior
arises as a consequence of increases or decreases in any one of
numerous strength-related value properties included in the exper-
iments, including ratings of value strength, value centrality, value
certainty, and value relevance. Alternatively, value use could be
subject to analogical reasoning (Pathway B). In this case, the
typicality effect should not be mediated by the strength-related
properties of the abstract value representation; instead, analogical
reasoning would be evident in participants’ perceptions of simi-
larity and relevance between the instantiations and their subse-
quent behavior (Pathway B). Finally, differences in the process of
value application itself would be evident in the extent to which the
participants spontaneously mapped the instantiated value onto the
subsequent context (Pathway C; see Experiment 4).
Experiment 1
Participants in Experiment 1 were asked to consider reasons for
the value of equality in situations that used a typical or atypical
instantiation of the value within the same context prior to measur-
ing egalitarian behavior. Between the manipulation and the behav-
ioral measure, we assessed value importance, value strength, and
participants’ confidence in the reasons that they listed. The assess-
ments of value importance and value strength helped to ensure that
the value of equality would be salient in all conditions prior to the
measure of behavior. At the same time, they enabled us to test
whether changes in value importance or strength might account for
the effect of typicality. We expected that participants who consid-
ered reasons for the value with a typical instantiation would act in
a manner more consistent with the value than if they had consid-
ered the value with an atypical instantiation or had completed
ratings that made the value salient (control).
1 All of the instances of the categories in the cognitive research fall
within the broader concepts. For example, although robin is a typical
instance of a bird and penguin is not, there is no doubt that they are both
birds. Similarly, in our research, the instantiations are instances of the value
under examination and are therefore equally relevant. It is simply the
typicality of the instances that varies.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 90 Cardiff University undergraduate psychol-
ogy students (76 women and 14 men) who participated for course
credit or £4 (approximately $6.50 American). Seven additional
participants were eliminated from analyses because of failure to
follow instructions.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups of five to nine people, seated
approximately 5 ft apart. All participants were informed that they
would be taking part in a number of different studies that had been
combined because they were short. The first study contained the
manipulation. The second study contained seven questions ensur-
ing the salience of equality as a value by assessing its importance
and strength. The third study contained a measure of intergroup
discrimination. After completing the measures, a funnel debriefing
technique was used in which participants were first asked gener-
ally about their impressions of the studies and were then asked
progressively more specific questions about the procedures. No
participants indicated any suspicion of a connection between the
studies.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical condition. The experimenter stated that the first study
looked at why social values are considered important in different
situations. Participants were told that they would be presented with
a randomly selected social value and then asked to list reasons why
it was important to consider that value in a specified situation.
Participants were then presented with the situation “You must
choose between a male and a female candidate for the position of
Executive Vice President of a company” and were asked to give as
many reasons as possible why the value of equality was important
in this situation. Participants were given 7 min to list their reasons
on a page of lined paper and were asked to use the entire time.
Atypical condition. Participants in this condition followed a
similar procedure as above except that they were asked to list
reasons for equality with an atypical instantiation of the value,
rather than a typical instantiation. Specifically, the context in-
volved choosing between a person who was right-handed and a
person who was left-handed for the position of Executive Vice
President of a company.
Control condition. The experimenter stated that the first study
was looking at reasoning about everyday choices. Participants
were asked to imagine walking into their local coffee shop and
ordering their favorite drink. They were then asked to give as many
reasons as possible as to why they liked that particular beverage,
using a page of lined paper. Participants were given 7 min to list
their reasons and were asked to use the entire time. (The value of
equality was then made salient using the value measures described
below.)
Confidence in Reasons
After listing their reasons (but still as part of the first study),
participants in all conditions were asked to reread the reasons that
they had listed and to place markings (e.g., /) to denote where each
reason began and ended. Participants then rated how confident
they felt about each reason by placing a number from 1 (not at all
confident) to 6 (extremely confident) beside it. Each participant’s
ratings were then averaged across the reasons.
Value Importance and Strength
Participants were informed that the purpose of the second study
was to assess the importance and strength of various social values
to students. Participants in the typical and atypical conditions were
informed that they would be presented with the same randomly
selected social value for which they had previously listed reasons.
Participants in the control condition were told that the social value
was randomly selected. In reality, all participants were presented
with questions about the value of equality. The first item, “How
important is equality as a guiding principle in your life?”, was
taken from the Schwartz (1992) Value Survey and was answered
using a 9-point scale from 1 (opposed to my values) to 7
(extremely important). This asymmetrical scale format is fre-
quently used to assess value importance because of consensual
support for most values (see Schwartz, 1992). The other items
included “To what extent does the concept of equality describe you
and your concerns?”, “How certain do you feel about the impor-
tance of equality?”, “How strong are your feelings about equal-
ity?”, “How relevant is equality to how you see yourself?”, “How
confident are you about the importance that you attach to equal-
ity?”, and “How intensely do you feel about equality?”. Partici-
pants responded to the first item, which taps value centrality
(Verplanken & Holland, 2000), using an 11-point scale from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (very well) and to the latter five items using a 9-point
scale from 0 (not at all) to 8 (extremely). These latter six items
were highly intercorrelated (  .88), and therefore, we calculated
z scores for each and averaged them into a single measure of value
strength. These questions served the dual function of (a) assessing
whether instantiation typicality affects properties of the values at a
more abstract level and (b) priming the value of equality in all
conditions prior to our measure of intergroup discrimination (be-
low; Maio et al., 2001).
Measure of Intergroup Discrimination
The measure of intergroup discrimination was an adaptation of
Tajfel’s (1970) minimal group paradigm. The experimenter stated
that the purpose of the third study was to examine decision making
in multiple-choice situations and that participants would be play-
ing a quiz game similar to “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.” The
experimenter told participants that they would be randomly as-
signed to either a red group or a blue group and that they would be
asked to allocate points to other members of both groups before
starting the game. To randomly assign group membership, each
participant was asked to draw a slip of paper from a cup. Half of
the slips in the cup had red printed on them, and the other half had
blue printed on them. On all of the slips was a number between 30
and 100. Participants were told that the number was a code for
them to write in their decision booklets, which the experimenter
subsequently distributed.
Next, the experimenter informed participants that their decisions
would affect future participants who, in the following week, would
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be randomly assigned a group color and code number. He ex-
plained that the future participants would also play the quiz and
would start with a number of points decided by the current par-
ticipants’ responses in their decision booklets. The experimenter
then gave participants general instructions on how to make point
allocations using the matrices in their booklets (see Bourhis,
Sachdev, & Gagnon, 1994, for a description of these instructions).
After explaining how to allocate the points, the experimenter
mentioned a caveat to the task. Specifically, participants were told
that they would start their own game with the average number of
points that members of their group assigned to future members of
their group. Thus, the more points that participants allocated to
their own group, the more points they would receive themselves.
This caveat is a modification of the Tajfel (1970) paradigm that
Maio et al. (2001) used to give participants added incentive to
favor their own group (see Turner, 1978) and to increase the
conflict with participants’ value of equality.
Participants then indicated their group color and code number
on the front of their booklets. The next six pages each contained
one Tajfel matrix (see Figure 2 for two examples), all of which
were adapted from Bourhis et al. (1994). Each matrix contained
two rows and 13 columns. At the beginning of each row, there was
a code number designating a future participant and a color iden-
tifying the group to which the future participants belonged. The top
row always identified a member of the red group, and the bottom
row always identified a member of the blue group (see Maio et al.,
2001). For each matrix, participants were asked to put a cross in
the column that corresponded to the number of points they wished
to allocate to the two future participants. Participants were also
asked to write their choice below the matrix.
As the simplest way of determining participants’ engagement in
pro-value behavior, the number of points allocated to the outgroup
was subtracted from the number of points allocated to the ingroup
across the six matrices (see Bernard, Maio, & Olson, 2003, for
further explanation of this procedure). Higher scores on this index
indicate more ingroup favoritism and lower egalitarianism. A score
of zero represented maximum egalitarianism, while a score of 72
represented maximum ingroup favoritism. (Scores lower than zero
represented outgroup favoritism, which was extremely rare in our
experiments.)
Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participant on our
dependent variables, so all subsequent analyses were collapsed
across this variable.
Matrix 1: 
Please place a checkmark in the box that contains the points 
that you give to subject 115 in the RED group and subject 128 
in the BLUE group: 
 
115   RED 
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20 
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23 
 
24 
 
25 
 
26 
 
27 
 
28 
 
128  BLUE 
 
16 
 
15 
 
14 
 
13 
 
12 
 
11 
 
10 
 
9  
 
8  
 
7  
 
6  
 
5  
 
4  
 
Please write the points that each person receives according to 
the box that you have chosen: 
Points for 115 of RED:    
Points for 128 of BLUE:  
Matrix 2: 
Please place a checkmark in the box that contains the points 
that you give to subject 116 in the RED group and subject 113 
in the BLUE group:
 
116   RED 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
113  BLUE 
 
28 
 
27 
 
26 
 
25 
 
24 
 
23 
 
22 
 
21 
 
20 
 
19  
 
18  
 
17 
 
16 
Please write the points that each person receives according to 
the box that you have chosen: 
Points for 116 of RED:        
Points for 113 of BLUE:      
Figure 2. Point allocation matrices used to measure pro-value behavior.
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Number of Reasons
One of the authors counted the number of reasons listed by each
participant. (The reasons were demarcated by the participants in
their ratings of confidence about each reason.) A one-way (typical
vs. atypical vs. control) analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a
significant difference between the number of reasons listed in the
different conditions, F(2, 87)  26.03, p  .001, p2  .37. Using
the Tukey honestly significant difference post hoc test, there were
no significant differences between the typical (M  4.63, SD 
1.16) and atypical (M  4.10; SD  1.52) reasons conditions,
t(87)  0.87, ns, but participants in the control condition (M 
8.17, SD  3.64) listed significantly more reasons than partici-
pants in the typical, t(87)  5.76, p  .001, and atypical condi-
tions, t(87)  6.64, p  .001. This result is consistent with Maio
and Olson’s (1998) observation that participants have more diffi-
culty listing reasons for values than reasons regarding attitudes
toward mundane objects.
Confidence in Reasons
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA revealed
that participants’ confidence in their reasons did not differ across
typical (M  4.35), atypical (M  4.59), and control (M  4.34)
conditions, F(2, 87)  0.83, ns, p2  .02.
Value Importance and Strength
One-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVAs revealed no
significant effects of the manipulation on participants’ postma-
nipulation ratings of the importance of equality (typical M  5.83,
SD  1.02; atypical M  5.57, SD  1.14; control M  5.50,
SD  1.11), F(2, 87)  0.79, ns, p2  .02, or on the measure of
value strength (typical M  0.00, SD  0.83; atypical M  0.10,
SD  0.79; control M  0.10, SD  0.80), F(2, 87)  0.65, ns,
p
2  .01. Similar results were found with separate analyses of the
six items that constituted the measure of value strength (all ps 
.11). These six items included measures of value centrality, value
certainty, and value relevance, none of which were affected by the
typicality manipulation.
Intergroup Discrimination
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA found
significant effects on the intergroup discrimination index, F(2,
87) 6.30, p .01, p2 .13. A planned comparison revealed that
participants in the typical condition exhibited less ingroup favor-
itism (M  34.27, SD  30.39) than participants in both the
control condition (M  54.87, SD  19.23) and the atypical
condition (M  53.57, SD  24.67), t(87)  3.54, p  .01.
Tendencies to favor the ingroup did not differ between the atypical
and control conditions, t(87)  0.20, ns.
Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed that typical value instantiation elicited
more subsequent pro-value behavior than the atypical value in-
stantiation or a condition that allowed participants to restate the
importance of the value to them. Specifically, this effect was
driven by the typical condition; participants in this condition were
more egalitarian than participants in either the atypical or control
conditions, which did not differ significantly from each other. Not
surprisingly, the typical condition did not eliminate bias com-
pletely because the confidence interval (CI) for bias in this con-
dition did not include zero (CI
.95  22.92, 45.61). This reduction
without elimination is to be expected within our incentive-loaded
variant of the minimal group paradigm, which provided partici-
pants with substantial incentive to favor their own group. Indeed,
ingroup bias was significantly greater than zero in every condition
of our subsequent experiments as well.
More important, the effect of the typicality manipulation pro-
vides the first direct support for our claim that a complete under-
standing of value-guided behavior requires closer attention to the
actual processes by which values are brought to bear. Previously,
research focused on effects of values independent of their instan-
tiations. However, it is cognitively far from trivial to bridge the
gap from abstract value to specific situation and decide that a
situation provides an instance to which the value applies. Exper-
iment 1 provides novel evidence that, for this bridging inherent in
value application, recent instantiations matter. Specifically, it mat-
tered whether participants had thought of equality in the typical
context of discrimination between men and women or in the
atypical context of discrimination between left-handers and right-
handers, even though the value of equality was made highly salient
in both cases (and equally relevant to the subsequent scenario).
Additional evidence yielded clues about the potential processes
involved in this effect. The effect did not occur because typical
instantiations increased participants’ confidence about their rea-
sons, the perceived importance of the value, the strength of the
value, or the number of reasons linked to the value. Participants
also showed no awareness of the link between the first study and
the subsequent behavioral task in our extensive debriefing. These
findings provide initial evidence that the effect on subsequent
behavior is not brought about by changes at the abstract value level
(Pathway A) or by a straightforward conscious use of analogical
reasoning (Pathway B), but we revisited these possibilities in each
of the subsequent experiments.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used a design that maps more closely onto real-
world situations. Despite the importance of reasoning and the use
of reasons to elicit value-consistent behavior in previous research
(e.g., Maio et al., 2001), most real-world instantiations do not
involve explication of reasons for a value (Maio & Olson, 1998).
In everyday life, individuals simply experience, hear about, or read
an account of an incident without necessarily considering reasons
for or against the values involved. Is it sufficient to simply imagine
a typical instantiation of a value for effects on subsequent behavior
to occur, or is it necessary to also produce or read reasons for a
value? The answer to this question would shed light on the process
underlying the use of values, and no previous research has ad-
dressed the possibility of encouraging pro-value behavior simply
via elaborated instantiations.
Experiment 2 therefore presented an expanded version of the
typical or atypical instantiation used in Experiment 1 for a limited
time (3 min), and no reasons were requested. Participants then
completed the same measure of egalitarian behavior as in the prior
experiment.
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Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 60 (46 female, 11 male, and 3 who failed to
indicate their sex) high school A-level students in different schools
across South Wales. Another 7 participants were eliminated from
analyses because of failure to follow instructions or because they
exhibited suspicion. All participants took part on a voluntary basis
and completed the same basic procedure followed in Experiment 1
except for alterations to the experimental manipulation (below).
This manipulation simply varied the content of a value instantia-
tion (typical, atypical vs. control) that participants were asked to
read. Participants then completed measures of value importance
and centrality from Experiment 1, which also served to make the
value of equality salient before completing the measure of inter-
group discrimination. The measure of intergroup discrimination
was the same as in Experiment 1.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical instantiation. In this condition, participants were told
that the first study was investigating people’s perceptions of the
involvement of social values in different situations. They read an
expanded version of the typical instantiation from the previous
experiment for 3 min. Specifically, participants were presented
with a short story that described interviews for the position of
Executive Vice President. The story described interviews that took
place at a local cafe´ to accommodate the large numbers of people
on the interview panel. Candidates had to make a presentation to
the panel members on their ideas for the future of the company.
The description ended with two sentences suggesting that an
inadvertent physical feature of the setting (a cobblestone floor)
caused unintentional discrimination against the female candidates:
Unfortunately, the cobblestones meant that the female candidates had
a very hard time of walking while giving their presentations, because
of the heels on their shoes. The male candidates did not have this
difficulty and made better impressions on the interview panel.
Atypical instantiation. The procedure in this condition was
identical to that used in the typical instantiation except that the text
ended with two sentences suggesting that an inadvertent physical
feature of the setting (placing of the lectern) caused unintentional
discrimination against left-handed candidates:
Unfortunately, the set up of the equipment meant that the left-handed
candidates had a very hard time making their presentation; they had to
walk from the lectern to the other side of the screen to use their left
hand to point out important information. Right-handers could stay at
the lectern and continue to glance at their notes, and these candidates
made better impressions on the interview panel.
Control condition. In this condition, participants were in-
formed that the first study would present them with two questions
about a randomly selected social value. All participants in this
condition proceeded directly to the measures of value importance
and strength.
Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participants on our
principal dependent variable (intergroup discrimination), so all
analyses were conducted across sex.
Value Importance and Centrality
Consistent with Experiment 1, one-way (typical vs. atypical vs.
control) ANOVAs again revealed no significant effects of the
manipulation on participants’ postmanipulation ratings of the im-
portance of equality (typical M  6.05, SD  1.00; atypical M 
6.00, SD  1.08; control M  6.22, SD  0.65), F(2, 57)  0.30,
ns, p
2  .01, or on value centrality (typical M  7.14, SD  1.83;
atypical M 6.90, SD 2.34; control M 6.78, SD 1.99), F(2,
57)  0.16, ns, p2  .01.
Intergroup Discrimination
Also consistent with Experiment 1, a one-way (typical vs.
atypical vs. control) ANOVA revealed significant effects on the
index of intergroup discrimination, F(2, 57)  6.20, p  .01, p2
 .18. A planned comparison revealed that participants in the
typical condition exhibited less ingroup favoritism (M  13.36,
SD  23.36) than participants in both the atypical (M  30.35,
SD  28.84) and the control conditions (M  43.44, SD 
29.32), t(57)  3.24, p  .05. Tendencies to favor the ingroup
did not differ between the atypical and control conditions,
t(57)  1.49, ns.
Discussion
Experiment 2 supported the hypothesis that the typicality of the
instantiation is sufficient to influence participants’ subsequent
behavior even when no reasons are contemplated. This is the first
evidence that an extended instantiation alone can impact subse-
quent, unrelated behavior; participants were more egalitarian after
reading an extended version of the typical (male vs. female job
decision) instantiation than after reading an extended version of
the atypical (left-hander vs. right-hander job decision) instantiation
or after simply rating the importance and centrality of equality.
Crucially, the typical and atypical instantiations were within the
same situational context, and it was only their typicality that was
manipulated.
As in Experiment 1, there were clues about the viability of
different processes for explaining this effect. The effect was again
not mediated by an impact on the importance or centrality of the
value (Pathway A). Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, the funnel
debriefing revealed no evidence that this effect was due to a
perceived link between the typical instantiations and the subse-
quent behaviors (Pathway B).
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 tested the generalizability of the typicality effect
using new instantiations, again in the workplace context. Both
instantiations involved discrimination against groups that are im-
portant potential targets of prejudice. The typical instantiation
involved discrimination against a Black applicant, and the atypical
instantiation involved discrimination against an applicant with a
disability. As in our prior examination of gender and handedness,
separate data supported our use of race as a more typical instan-
tiation than disability. Twenty participants in our sample popula-
tion (i.e., Cardiff University undergraduates) were asked a number
of questions about the typicality (eight items) and acceptability/
legality of discrimination (three items) based on race and disabil-
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ity. Examples include “To what extent do you think race (disabil-
ity) discrimination is a typical example of discrimination?”, “How
frequently does discrimination against Blacks (people with slight
disabilities [e.g., an eye patch]) occur in the workplace (e.g., at the
job interview stage)?”, and “To what extent do you think it is
acceptable to discriminate on the basis of race (disability)?” As
expected, participants rated race discrimination as being more
typical than disability discrimination ( p  .03), and virtually all
regarded both instances of discrimination as being highly unac-
ceptable/illegal (creating insufficient item variance to form a reli-
able index). Despite the change in target groups, we expected that
the typical instantiation would again evoke more subsequent egal-
itarian behavior than the atypical instantiation.
In addition, Experiment 3 used two alternative measures to
explore Pathways A and B as explanations for the effect of typical
instantiations. With regard to Pathway A, the experiment tested
whether the typical instantiation affects the manner in which
people regulate their pursuit of the abstract value. Higgins (1998)
drew a distinction between people’s wants and desires and the
oughts and norms that they perceive from other people and society
generally. It is possible that, although participants’ perception of
the importance or centrality of equality does not change in the
different instantiations, their perception of the extent to which they
want to or feel they should use equality does change. This effect
would contradict the claim that the effects do not operate through
Pathway A (i.e., without mediation through the abstract value). To
examine this possibility, participants completed measures of the
extent to which they would want to and would feel they should use
equality in their general decision making.
With regard to Pathway B, the experiment tested whether the
typical instantiation provides support for pro-value behavior by
perhaps affecting the emotions felt for that specific situation,
which could affect emotional experience in the subsequent situa-
tion. For example, people might feel more sympathy for the victim
of inadvertent discrimination in the typical instantiation than in the
atypical instantiation. Because empathy tends to elicit greater
pro-social behavior (e.g., Batson & Tecia, 1999), it is possible that
the elicitation of greater empathy in the typical instantiation leads
to an increase in empathy for outgroup members in the subsequent
situation, causing an increase in egalitarian behavior. To explore
this possibility, participants were presented with the situation and
asked to rate the extent to which they felt sympathy for the
individual involved.
Method
Participants
Participants were 60 (47 female, 11 male, and 2 who failed to
indicate their gender) Cardiff University undergraduate students
who participated for course credit or £3 (approximately $5.00
American). Eight additional participants were excluded from anal-
yses for failure to complete all sections of the study or for indi-
cating suspicion.
Procedure
Participants were seated approximately 5 ft apart in groups of
two to seven. Following a similar procedure to the previous ex-
periments, all participants were informed that they would be taking
part in two different studies: The first contained the manipulation
and the value measures, and the second contained the measure of
intergroup discrimination used in the prior experiments. Partici-
pants were debriefed and probed for suspicion using the funnel
debriefing method.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical instantiation. Following the same procedures as in
Experiment 2, the experimenter presented a short story that de-
scribed interviews for the position of Executive Vice President.
(This overarching story line was maintained from the previous
experiments because participants often noted the ecological valid-
ity of the situation during debriefing in the prior experiments.) The
story described interviews that included a half-hour presentation
and then a formal interview by a large panel of interviewers. The
description ended with three sentences suggesting that nervousness
on the part of several members of the interview panel, who were
keen to avoid prejudice, caused unintentional discrimination
against the Black candidate:
Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited ex-
perience with people from ethnic minorities and were nervous about
appearing uncomfortable or biased. The Black applicant picked up on
their nervousness, which affected his confidence and made him an-
swer questions more tentatively. As a result, the White applicants
made better impressions on the interview panel.
Atypical instantiation. The procedure in this condition was
identical to that used in the typical instantiation condition except
that the text in this condition ended with three sentences suggest-
ing that nervousness on the part of several members of the inter-
view panel, who were keen to avoid prejudice, caused uninten-
tional discrimination against a candidate with an eye patch:
Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited ex-
perience of people with disabilities and were nervous about appearing
uncomfortable or biased. The applicant with an eye patch picked up
on their nervousness, which affected his confidence and made him
answer questions more tentatively. As a result, the other applicants
made better impressions on the interview panel.
Control condition. In this condition, participants were in-
formed that the first study was about social values and that they
would be presented with three questions about a randomly selected
social value. Participants in this condition proceeded directly to the
general value and regulatory focus measures.
General Value and Regulatory Focus Measures
Participants were asked to rate the importance of equality to
them as a guiding principle in their life, using a 9-point scale from
1 (opposed to my values) to 7 (extremely important). In addition,
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt they
should use and would want to use equality in their decision making
in general, using two 11-point scales from 0 (not at all) to 10
(definitely).
Associated Affect
Participants in the typical and atypical conditions were asked to
rate how sorry they felt for the candidate who was discriminated
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against and how sympathetic they felt toward the candidate, using
11-point scales from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely).
Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participant on any of
the dependent variables, so all analyses were collapsed across sex.
General Value and Regulatory Focus Measures
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, a one-way (typical vs.
atypical vs. control) ANOVA revealed no significant effects of the
manipulation on participants’ postmanipulation ratings of the im-
portance of equality (typical M  5.35, SD  1.53; atypical M 
5.60, SD  1.14; control M  5.45, SD  1.00), F(2, 57)  0.20,
ns, p
2  .01. In addition, one-way ANOVAs revealed no signif-
icant effects of the manipulation on the extent that participants
should use equality in general (typical M  8.60, SD  1.14;
atypical M 7.90, SD 1.65; control M 7.95, SD 1.39), F(2,
57)  1.53, ns, p2  .05, or on the extent that participants would
want to use equality in general (typical M  8.65, SD  1.46;
atypical M 8.15, SD 1.27; control M 7.95, SD 1.61), F(2,
57)  1.23, ns, p2  .04. This was also the case when these
measures were combined (typical M  8.62, SD  1.21; atypical
M  8.03, SD  1.25; control M  7.95, SD  1.43), F(2, 57) 
1.62, ns, p2  .05.2
Associated Affect
Our t tests revealed no significant effects of the (typical vs.
atypical) manipulation on participants’ ratings of how sorry (typ-
ical M 7.75, SD 1.37; atypical M 6.70, SD 2.43), t(38)
1.68, ns, or sympathetic (typical M  7.45, SD  1.61; atypical
M 7.10, SD 2.02), t(38) 0.61, ns, they felt for the individual
in the story. A combined measure of sorrow and sympathy ( 
.81) revealed similar null effects (typical M  7.60, SD  1.39;
atypical M  6.90, SD  2.15), t(38)  1.22, ns.
Intergroup Discrimination
A one-way (typical vs. atypical vs. control) ANOVA found
significant effects on the index of intergroup discrimination, F(2,
57)  6.54, p  .01, p2  .19. As in the prior experiments, a
planned comparison revealed that participants in the typical con-
dition exhibited less ingroup favoritism (M  27.00, SD  30.55)
than participants in both the atypical (M 51.85, SD 21.30) and
the control conditions (M  53.20, SD  24.69), t(57)  3.61,
p  .01. Again, tendencies to favor the ingroup did not differ
between the atypical and control conditions, t(57)  0.17, ns.3
Discussion
Using new instantiations, Experiment 3 again found that the
typicality of the instantiation had a significant influence on par-
ticipants’ subsequent pro-value behavior. Participants were more
egalitarian after reading the typical instantiation (Black candidate)
than after reading the atypical instantiation (candidate with an eye
patch) or after simply completing the general value measures.
Despite the change in instantiations from Experiments 1 and 2,
typicality mattered once more. Across Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the
effect held across three different operationalizations.
As in the two previous experiments, this effect was not mediated
by an impact on the importance of the value at an abstract level. In
fact, two additional experiments found that the procedures did not
affect value accessibility and a number of other properties of the
value at an abstract level, as described in Footnote 2. Also, the
effect of typicality was not mediated by any impact of the manip-
ulation on regulatory focus toward the value or affective associa-
tions with the individual in the instantiation. In addition, partici-
pants again denied a connection between the prior instantiation and
the new situation in the funnel debriefing. Overall, these results
consistently indicate that the effects did not occur through the
changes associated with the strength or accessibility of abstract
values per se (Pathway A) or through a straightforward analogical
mapping from one situation to another (Pathway B).
2 Two additional experiments examined a variety of other potential
changes in the value at an abstract level. In one of the experiments, we gave
40 (35 female and 5 male) participants the materials from either the typical
or atypical condition of Experiment 3 and then asked them to complete
measures of the accessibility of the concept of equality, based on two
well-established reaction-time methods. In the other experiment, 162 (147
female and 15 male) participants completed the typicality manipulation
followed by questions designed to measure familiarity with the value of
equality, self-efficacy, and utility of the value for the self and others. The
effects of the manipulation on value accessibility and the other variables
were very weak and nonsignificant. The only exception was that partici-
pants in the typical condition felt that other people needed to use equality
less, t(160)  2.56, p  .05, but this odd result does not seem to explain
the effects of typicality on greater egalitarianism. Overall, then, we have
consistently obtained no evidence supporting the view that typicality of
instantiation exerts an effect through strength-related aspects of equality as
an abstract value.
3 Our approach to calculating ingroup favoritism is similar to methods
used by Berkowitz (1994) and Maio et al. (2001). These were adopted to
avoid potential pitfalls of motivational pull scores (Bourhis et al., 1994).
Moreover, during debriefing, a number of participants explained that their
allocation of points was derived across the six matrices and not from each
one independently (e.g., “If I gave more to my team on one page, I gave
more to the other team on another”). Such techniques would be ignored by
the traditional pull calculations. Nevertheless, to enable a comparison with
pull scores, we include the relevant pull scores for Experiment 3. These
scores reflect the pull of one strategy against others (e.g., equality against
ingroup profit and maximum difference). Consistent with the overall dif-
ference scores, planned comparisons revealed that participants in the typ-
ical instantiation condition showed a stronger pull for equality against
ingroup profit and maximum difference (M  6.15, SD  5.74) than
participants in both the atypical (M  1.75, SD  5.06) and control
conditions (M  1.45, SD  4.37), t(57)  3.27, p  .01. In addition,
participants in the typical condition showed a weaker pull of maximum
difference against ingroup profit and joint profit (M  4.00, SD  4.53)
than participants in both the atypical (M  7.85, SD  4.18) and control
conditions (M  7.80, SD  5.20), t(57)  3.00, p  .05, and partici-
pants in the typical condition exhibited a weaker pull of ingroup favoritism
and maximizing difference against joint profit (M  4.30, SD  5.38) than
participants in both the atypical (M  8.70, SD  4.16) and control
conditions (M  8.65, SD  4.54), t(57)  3.39, p  .05. Similar trends
were evident in the other experiments.
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Experiment 4
The first three experiments repeatedly revealed that typical
instantiations make it more likely that subsequent pro-value be-
havior will occur than do atypical instantiations. Given the con-
sistency of these results, we turned our attention to focus more
closely on the mechanism issue.
The preceding experiments did not reveal an influence of in-
stantiations on the abstract value or a simple process of analogical
reasoning. This leaves us with Pathway C as the strongest potential
candidate for explaining the effect of typical value instantiations.
That is, the typical instantiation may affect the process of applying
the value to a subsequent situation. A typical instantiation may
make people more perceptually ready to see a value in a subse-
quent situation because typical instantiations are more central in
representations of a concept. This centrality should make it more
likely that participants will construe the subsequent situation as
being relevant to the value that was given the typical instantiation.
In the context of values, a key characteristic of this differential
application of the value should be differences in the specific goals
that people form in the subsequent situation. Recent influential
models agree that values serve to express basic (and less abstract)
goals (Grouzet et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1992). For instance,
Schwartz’s (1992) circular model of values predicts that they are
interconnected in a manner that reveals specific motivational con-
flicts and compatibilities that arise in daily attempts to reconcile
self, social, and societal pressures. This type of motivational foot-
print of values has been revealed in many studies using different
paradigms (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Maio, Pakizeh, Cheung, &
Rees, in press; Pakizeh, Gebauer, & Maio, 2007; Roccas, Sagiv,
Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). With regard
to the value of equality in particular, the circular model predicts
that this value stands in conflict with goals focusing on personal
interests (e.g., success) or ingroup protection. Consequently, any
application of equality to a situation should simultaneously entail
lower concern with personal interests and ingroup protection in
that situation. Thus, if Pathway C for explaining the typicality
effect is valid, we should be more likely to detect this difference in
these situationally instantiated goals following a typical instantia-
tion of the value than following its atypical instantiation.
It is important that this explanation focuses on goal changes in
the situation. We are not implying that there are changes in the
general, trans-situational importance of equality as a goal. Exper-
iment 3 did not find changes in regulatory focus toward equality at
a general level, nor did we see any other evidence of differences in
motivational attachment to this value in numerous other measures.
An important difference between those findings and the approach
implied by Pathway C is that all of our previous measures gave
people the value concept and looked at responses to it, whereas
Pathway C suggests that we should look at spontaneous construal
of the values in the subsequent, new situation. The latter approach
is more suitable to detecting differences in perceptual readiness or
application.
Experiment 4 therefore tested whether the typicality of the
instantiation of equality affects the later application of this value
by shaping the goals that people spontaneously experience in the
subsequent situation. We assessed four goals that are relevant to
our variant of the minimal group paradigm. Specifically, partici-
pants were asked to indicate the extent to which they were moti-
vated during their point allocations by success (recall that our
variant allows points for the self to be proportional to ingroup
points), ingroup protection, equality, and outgroup protection. Of
course, this measurement approach takes a chance that participants
can accurately report their own goals, and it is possible that the
situationally instantiated goals occur at too low a level of con-
sciousness for this to occur. Nonetheless, this measurement ap-
proach could yield cogent evidence if it turns out that a difference
in situationally instantiated goals completely mediates the effects
of prior instantiation, while all of the other measures of value at an
abstract level have not done so.
In addition, Experiment 4 expanded the exploration of the
analogical reasoning mechanism (Pathway B) by asking partici-
pants to complete a series of items assessing the extent to which
they thought that the prior instantiation was relevant to their point
allocations. Given the prior evidence failing to support Pathway B,
we expected that the typical instantiation would be more likely to
cause lower self- and ingroup-favoring (pro-equality) goals, with-
out affecting participants’ perceptions of the relevance of the
instantiations to their discrimination decisions. Moreover, the ef-
fect on situationally instantiated goals should mediate the impact
of the typicality manipulation on point allocation. These effects
were examined using the typical instantiation from Experiment 3
(discrimination against Blacks) and the atypical instantiation from
Experiments 1 and 2 (discrimination against left-handers). This
comparison of instantiations from different experiments enabled us
to further test the robustness of the typicality effect.
Method
Participants
Participants were 77 (60 female, 17 male) undergraduate stu-
dents from Cardiff University and the University of Glamorgan
(Pontypridd, Wales) who participated for course credit or volun-
tarily. Four additional participants were excluded from analyses
for failure to complete all sections of the study or for indicating
suspicion.
Procedure
Participants were seated approximately 5 ft apart in groups of
two to 17. Following a similar procedure to the previous experi-
ments, all participants were informed that they would be taking
part in two different studies: The first contained the manipulation
and the measure of the importance of equality, and the second
contained the measure of intergroup discrimination used in the
prior experiments. After these measures, participants completed
four items tapping the goals that they experienced while complet-
ing the minimal group paradigm. Participants then completed a
variety of items assessing their perceptions of the prior situation
that they had read about, including items assessing typicality and
the relevance of the situation to decisions in the minimal group
paradigm. A separate control condition was not included in this
experiment because the above-mentioned questions were not ap-
plicable when the manipulation scenario was absent. (Moreover,
Experiments 1–3 also made clear that the effects of the manipu-
lation on discrimination were carried solely by the typical instan-
tiation condition.) As in the prior experiments, participants were
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debriefed and probed for suspicion using the funnel debriefing
method.
Experimental Manipulation
Typical instantiation. Following the same procedures as in
Experiment 3, participants were presented with a short story that
described interviews for the position of Executive Vice President.
The story described interviews that included a half-hour presenta-
tion and then a formal interview by a large panel of interviewers.
The description ended with three sentences suggesting that ner-
vousness on the part of several members of the interview panel,
who were keen to avoid prejudice, caused unintentional discrim-
ination against the Black candidate:
Unfortunately, several of the members of the panel had limited ex-
perience with people from ethnic minorities and were nervous about
appearing uncomfortable or biased. The Black applicant picked up on
their nervousness, which affected his confidence and made him an-
swer questions more tentatively. As a result, the White applicants
made better impressions on the interview panel.
Atypical instantiation. The text was identical to that used in
the typical instantiation condition except that this version ended
with three sentences suggesting that there was unintentional dis-
crimination against a left-handed candidate:
Unfortunately, the presentation lectern was set up in a way that made
it difficult for left-handers to use. The left-handed applicant became
nervous and clumsy while giving the presentation, which made him
answer questions more tentatively. As a result, the other applicants
made better impressions on the interview panel.
Importance of Equality
As in the prior experiments, participants rated the importance of
equality to them immediately after having read the typical or
atypical instantiation, using a 9-point scale from 1 (opposed to
my values) to 7 (extremely important).
Situationally Instantiated Goals
Four questions asked participants about the extent to which they
considered “success,” “protecting my group,” “equality,” and
“protecting the other group” when they allocated points. Partici-
pants responded to each item using an 11-point scale from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (a large amount). After reverse-coding of the item
assessing the egalitarian goal, responses to the first three items
were significantly correlated (rs .33, ps .01), whereas the goal
to protect the other group did not relate significantly to success or
ingroup protection (|rs|  .07, ns). Thus, we averaged the first
three items to calculate a reliable index of the extent to which
participants sought to favor themselves or their own group ( 
.71). (The effects on this three-item scale yielded the same con-
clusions as from the equality item alone.) Outgroup protection
(which is very rarely seen in this paradigm) was not significantly
affected by our manipulation ( p  .89) and is therefore not
discussed further.4
Perceptions of the Instantiations
After rating their situational goals, participants completed 17
items assessing their perceptions of the instantiation that they had
read about and its relevance to the point allocation task. Partici-
pants responded to each item using an 11-point scale from 0 (not
at all) to 10 (extremely). These items first asked about the extent
that (a) participants thought about the scenario while they were
deciding how to allocate points, (b) the scenario influenced their
decision, (c) the scenario was relevant to their decision, (d) the
scenario was similar to the point dilemma, (e) they thought about
the interviewee, and (f) they thought about the interviewers.
The items then probed aspects of the instantiation potentially
relevant to its typicality. Specifically, participants rated (a) the
extent to which the situation was typical, (b) how frequently
people like the interviewee were not hired, (c) how often these
sorts of events occurred, (d) the seriousness of the situation, (e)
how much they could relate to the scenario, (f) how much the event
seemed like discrimination, (g) how often they thought about
discrimination against the group, (h) the extent to which discrim-
ination against the group was topical (i.e., newsworthy), (i) the
importance of the situation, (j) how likely it was that employers
discriminate against this group, and (k) the frequency of discrim-
ination against this group in high-powered jobs.
Supporting our categorization of the items, a principal-
components factor analysis of the items identified two factors
(using a scree plot to identify the number of factors). Rotation
of the factors using the varimax procedure revealed that virtu-
ally all of the items loaded above .30 on their respective factor.
Only the fifth typicality item (“Can you relate to this sce-
nario?”) possessed a lower loading (.27), so it was excluded
from our calculation of the final scales. The final scales were
calculated by averaging across the selected items, and internal
consistency was good for both the relevance scale (  .91) and
the typicality scale (  .83).
Results
There were no significant effects of sex of participant on any of
the dependent variables, so all analyses were collapsed across sex.
Importance of Equality
Consistent with Experiments 1, 2, and 3, a t-test comparison
revealed no significant effects of the typical versus atypical ma-
nipulation on participants’ postmanipulation ratings of the impor-
tance of equality (typical M 5.45, SD 1.37; atypical M 5.89,
SD  .81), t(75)  1.70, ns.
Perceived Relevance
A t test revealed a nonsignificant effect of the manipulation on
the index of perceived relevance (typical M  2.56, SD  2.27;
4 In addition, there was one open-ended question asking participants to
describe their reasons for assigning the points the way they did. Our own
coding of responses to this item revealed the same pattern of effects as in
the response scales but was not significant on its own. Its reliance on our
own coding may have made it more limited in accuracy and power than the
items that allowed participants to rate their goals. Nonetheless, it was
interesting that approximately half of the participants in each condition
mentioned concerns about fairness. These concerns show that participants
thought that equality was applicable to the minimal group setting.
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atypical M  2.07, SD  1.73), t(73)  1.05, p  .30. Thus, the
typical instantiation was not seen as being more or less relevant to
the minimal group paradigm than the atypical instantiation. Con-
firming indications from the prior funnel debriefings, both instan-
tiations were perceived as low in relevance (both Ms  3 on the
scale from 0 to 10).
Typicality
As expected, the typical instantiation was rated as more typical
(M  6.05, SD  1.43) than the atypical instantiation (M  5.20,
SD  1.40), t(72)  2.59, p  .02.
Intergroup Discrimination
A t test revealed a significant effect of the manipulation on the
index of intergroup discrimination, t(73) 2.02, p .05. As in the
prior experiments, participants in the typical instantiation condi-
tion exhibited less ingroup favoritism (M  22.55, SD  28.02)
than participants in the atypical instantiation condition (M 
35.57, SD  27.85).
Situationally Instantiated Goals
Participants who received the typical instantiation were less
likely to endorse the self- and ingroup-favoring goal (M  4.71,
SD  2.61) than participants who received the atypical instantia-
tion (M  6.17, SD  2.32), t(74)  2.57, p  .02. This goal,
in turn, predicted lower intergroup discrimination in a regression
with the self- and ingroup-favoring goal as the sole predictor,  
.74, t(72) 9.31, p .001. Furthermore, a regression analysis that
entered the self- and ingroup-favoring goal and experimental con-
dition as simultaneous predictors of discrimination supported the
hypothesis that the impact of the typicality manipulation was
mediated by its impact on the goals experienced in the situation
(see Figure 3). Specifically, the effect of the situationally instan-
tiated goals remained highly significant,   .75, t(71)  8.87,
p  .001, while the effect of the typicality manipulation became
negligible and nonsignificant,   .02, t(71)  0.26, p  .80. In
contrast, the effect of the typicality manipulation on situationally
instantiated goals was not eliminated,  .16, t(71) 2.05, p
.05, in a regression that included discrimination as a simultaneous
predictor of them. (This result argues against the interpretation that
participants were merely reporting their actual allocation behavior
in response to the items asking about their motives in the minimal
group paradigm.) The Sobel test for mediation through situation-
ally instantiated goals was significant (z  2.47, p  .02).
Discussion
Unlike each of the prior experiments, Experiment 4 discovered
a variable that does mediate the effect of typical instantiations on
subsequent behavior: situationally instantiated goals. In fact, the
role of situationally instantiated goals was powerful. The construal
of different goals from the situation completely mediated the effect
of instantiation on pro-value behavior: The effect of prior instan-
tiation was eliminated when the effect on situationally instantiated
goals was taken into account. This result locates and clarifies the
nature of the underlying mechanisms as belonging to Pathway C in
our model of potential mechanisms.
An interesting secondary aspect of the experiment is that it
included instantiations from different experiments. This new com-
parison is interesting because it introduced a subtle difference
between the typical instantiation and atypical instantiations: They
cited different distal causes for the discrimination that occurred.
Specifically, the discrimination in the typical instantiation was
inadvertently caused by the evaluation panel, while the atypical
instantiation involved discrimination elicited by the setting. We
know that this difference does not drive the effect of typicality
because this difference was not present in the comparisons used in
the prior experiments. Experiment 4 also showed that the distal
cause of the discrimination does not attenuate the effect either.
Despite this difference in the distal cause of the discrimination, the
effect of typicality was replicated. This attests to the robustness of
the typicality effect.
General Discussion
This research has provided consistent evidence that the way a
value is instantiated in one situation affects pro-value behavior in
a subsequent situation. Four experiments demonstrated that ex-
posure to a typical instantiation enhances subsequent pro-value
behavior, whereas exposure to an atypical instantiation does
not. This effect was first revealed in an experiment that did not
mention any explicit violation of this value (Experiment 1) and
then in experiments that mentioned a concrete situation with an
inadvertent violation of equality (Experiments 2, 3, and 4). In
the latter three experiments, the value was made salient using
instantiations that were akin to real-life situations. Together, the
results provide consistent evidence that the typicality of a value
instantiation affects the application of the value to subsequent
situations.
To locate the mechanism underlying the typicality effect, our
experiments included numerous properties of the value at an
abstract level, including measures of value importance, value
strength, value centrality, value relevance, value certainty,
value-associated affect, means of value regulation, value acces-
sibility, value familiarity, self-efficacy, and utility of the value
for the self and others (see also Footnote 2, above). None of
these variables were responsible for the results. Though partic-
ipants had ample opportunity to express increased commitment
to the value, there was no evidence that any of these variables
mediated the robust effect of typicality. The typicality of the
instantiations did not change any properties of the abstract
value, arguing against the abstract value mechanism postulated
.29* .75**
Value in 
Situation 2
Situation 1 Behavior 
.02
Figure 3. Support for Pathway C (see Figure 1) in Experiment 4. The
numbers alongside each path are the beta coefficients for the effect of the
predictor controlling for any other variable sharing a common criterion.
 p  .05.  p  .001.
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in our Pathway A (see Figure 1).5 Moreover, the lack of an
effect on value accessibility argues against any (remote) pos-
sibility that the typical instantiation condition merely primed
the value more strongly than the atypical instantiation condi-
tion. (This possibility is remote because we explicitly made the
value salient in the typical and atypical conditions, as noted
above.)
What seems clear is that a fundamental reorientation toward the
processes involved in value-congruent behavior is required if
values and their role in day-to-day life are to be fully understood.
People perceive no moral or rational basis for distinguishing
between the typical and atypical instantiations. Indeed, the vast
majority of participants rated all of the forms of discrimination to
be unacceptable and illegal. Simply put, people’s behavior in a
simple task that allocates points to two different teams was altered
by whether they had just thought about a typical or atypical
instantiation of equality within the same situational context even
though the value of equality was equally relevant to both instan-
tiations. Moreover, neither of these instantiations had any direct
bearing on the subsequent decision task. When we probed our
participants about these effects, none thought that they should be
or were influenced by the nature of the prior instantiation. To
them, there was no overt reason why seeing discrimination against
women or left-handers or against Blacks or the disabled should
cause different subsequent levels of discrimination in the minimal
group paradigm. In addition, participants perceived no link be-
tween our explicit priming of the value instantiation in the first
study and the behavioral measure in the subsequent study. Using
funnel debriefing throughout the four experiments, we excluded
participants who indicated any level of suspicion from the analy-
ses. Moreover, participants’ beliefs about the relevance of the
instantiations to their subsequent decisions in the minimal group
paradigm were not responsible for the greater effect of the typical
instantiation in Experiment 4. Together, these observations refute
the analogical reasoning explanation postulated in our Pathway B
(see Figure 1).
Instead, the results support the value-application mechanism
highlighted in our Pathway C (see Figure 1); that is, the typical
instantiation was more likely to shape the goals that were drawn
from the subsequent situation. In Experiment 4, the typical instan-
tiation of equality decreased the goal to be self- and ingroup-
favoring in the minimal group paradigm. This change in situation-
ally instantiated goals completely mediated the effect of the
typicality manipulation on subsequent discrimination. This pattern
suggests that prior instantiation is vital to understanding the pro-
cesses by which important and accessible values are applied to a
situation. This discovery is interesting in light of the prevailing
recognition that behavioral change can arise not only from changes
to representations but also from the processes following from these
representations (e.g., Janiszewski & Chandon, 2007; Reber &
Schwarz, 1999; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). The
present evidence shows that models of value–behavior linkage
need to encompass these processes.
It also seems likely that effects of prior processing will not be
limited to differences arising from typicality. Hence, future re-
search should seek other aspects of processing that might be
influential. At the same time, the typicality of instantiation itself is
determined by many factors (Barsalou, 1987), including central
tendency, ideals, and frequency of instantiation. This emergence
from constituent attributes is similar to the ways that the social
psychological constructs of identification, entitativity, and argu-
ment strength are emergent constructs from related attributes. A
classic quote on typicality illustrates our point:
It should be noted that each of the factors discussed so far—central
tendency, ideals, frequency of instantiation—accounts for unique typ-
icality variance. Each predicts typicality to a substantial extent after
effects of other possible determinants have been partialled out. . . . It
is safe to say that there are many reasons why exemplars are typical
and that no single factor or invariant set of factors is solely respon-
sible. (Barsalou, 1987, p. 105)
An interesting research agenda is to unravel in detail the different
subaspects of the typicality effect in a specific situation, especially
given the fact that there can (and frequently will) be several
aspects that make a case typical; these aspects vary across cases,
and typicality is the sole explanatory construct across them. What
matters in the current research, as in previous research in the
cognitive and social literature (e.g., Cherniak, 1984; Lord et al.,
1994), is that instances do vary in typicality and that these varia-
tions yield important effects. In essence, we have used the typi-
cality effect to show that the process of value application is
nontrivial and is crucial to when and why values are brought to
bear on situations even for such a highly important and central
value.
Although the dominant paradigm treats values solely as abstract
principles, the present evidence echoes some prior suggestions that
values might exist primarily as concrete instantiations (Kristiansen
& Zanna, 1988; Seligman & Katz, 1996). As we argued in the
introduction, abstract values must be instantiated for them to be
applied to a particular situation. Unlike the prior suggestions,
however, we expect that people also possess an abstract represen-
tation of the value, possibly formed from their total sets of instan-
tiations, just as occurs in other types of concept learning. In fact,
the current research provides evidence for the existence of both
levels of value representation. Despite the impact of the value
instantiations on subsequent behavior, neither value importance
nor value strength ratings differed across the instantiations, sug-
gesting that value representations at the higher, abstract level are
reasonably unaffected by instantiations of the value. However, if
an instantiation is a typical or familiar one, it is more likely to
facilitate the application of the idea to the new context. A complex
issue for future research involves untangling the ways in which
value instantiations and the abstract value are interlinked over
time.
The results across experiments have important implications for
understanding the nature and rationality of human moral judgment
and behavior. Equality is not just any old value; it is a fundamental
moral value (Schwartz, 1992), and as such, it is enshrined politi-
cally and legally in documents across the world, from the French
rallying call of “liberte´, egalite´, fraternite´” through to the U.N.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, Article 7), the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
5 Furthermore, the within-condition correlations between equality and
the difference in point allocation were not significant except for one
correlation opposite to the predicted direction (r  .36, p  .05, in
Experiment 1’s typical instantiation condition). These results provide ad-
ditional argument against Pathway A.
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Fundamental Freedoms (1950, Article 14), and individual national
constitutions, such as Amendments XV and XIX of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America (1787/1992). Yet, legal
materials and social psychological research have shown that it can
also be conceptualized in diverse ways, ranging from perspectives
that emphasize equality of outcomes to perspectives that empha-
size equality as a function of needs or inputs. In this way, the value
of equality is a good example of value instantiation more gener-
ally, which involves a range of complex judgments and decisions.
Although complex deliberations about values are also found in
daily life, the cognitive system often brings values to bear in a
seemingly effortless fashion. This suggests the possible use of
heuristics (see Newell & Simon, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974) in value-based decisions. Relevant to this hypothesis, sev-
eral authors have previously sought to make a case for moral
heuristics (e.g., Baron, 1993; Sunstein, 2005; see also Hahn, Frost,
& Maio, 2005), such as the distinction that is made between acts
of omission and acts of commission. Baron and colleagues (e.g.,
Haidt & Baron, 1996; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991) found that
participants judge individuals more harshly for an act of commis-
sion than for an act of omission, even given the involvement of the
same principles. That is, with the same issues at stake and, in
effect, the same decision to be made, the way that a moral choice
is instantiated can elicit different decisions (Baron, 1992).
However, the main difficulty in establishing moral heuristics is
that of finding a standard of correctness against which moral
outcomes can be judged. Absolute standards of moral rationality
are notoriously difficult to obtain (Harris, 1986; Pojman, 1998;
Seedhouse, 2002). So, in the above illustration, one might question
whether omissions and commissions are not relevantly dissimilar,
as evidenced by the fact that the criminal legal systems of many
countries make sophisticated and subtle distinctions between acts
of commission and omission (see Bennett, 1981). However, our
findings would seem to make a clear-cut case for which any kind
of rational justification would be difficult to establish. It cannot be
normative to display differing amounts of egalitarian behavior
merely as a function of prior exposure to a fictitious episode, in
particular as this exposure fails to modulate in any way partici-
pants’ overt perceptions of the relevance and importance of these
values. In fact, participants explicitly indicate that the value of
equality is highly important, central, and relevant; that they have
sympathy for the individual involved; and that they feel they
should use the value of equality in their decision making. Yet, with
all these variables being equal, the typicality of the instantiation of
the value plays a significant role in participants’ subsequent be-
havior in a task that presents strong incentives to be discrimina-
tory. Even within cognitive psychology, which has concerned
itself extensively with typicality, the focus has been on effects of
typicality on the processing of the instantiation itself (e.g., Battig
& Montague, 1969; Rosch, 1973; Stuss et al., 1983); there has
been no research on the effects of typicality on a subsequent
processing situation.
Although the present experiments show that instantiations of a
value affect its application to a subsequent situation, it would be
useful for future research to further expand this demonstration
beyond the intergroup context. The value of equality can be
applied to different individuals defined by group membership at an
intergroup level or to individuals defined within relationships at an
interpersonal level. In the present research, both variables occurred
at the intergroup level (i.e., there was discrimination against a
person because of group identity in both variables). In future
research, both variables could be manipulated at the interpersonal
level (e.g., using familial relationships). The role of instantiation
should be similar at both levels. A typical instantiation of the value
of equality in either case should provide more compelling support
for subsequent egalitarian behavior.
The findings also add to prior research that examined the effects
of elaborating reasons for a value on subsequent pro-value behav-
ior (Bernard et al., 2003; Maio et al., 2001). That is, such reasons
will have a significantly weaker (or null) effect when they feature
an atypical instantiation. This result indicates that Maio et al.’s
(2001) finding of increased pro-value behavior following concrete
instantiations occurred because participants in their research spon-
taneously thought of a typical instantiation (Rosch, 1975). In other
instances, people might not be guided to think of typical instan-
tiations. For example, some intervention strategies seek to increase
corporate citizenship by getting people to think about the impor-
tance of helpfulness (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999; McAlister &
Ferrell, 2002), but people’s typical thoughts about this value may
have more to do with charities and people in need than colleagues
at work or the role of the corporation within society. As a result,
such interventions may be less effective than other approaches.
This is not to suggest, however, that atypical instantiations
should be ignored or dismissed as unimportant. In contrast, they
may function as important testing grounds for people’s use of the
principle because they show how far an ideal may or may not be
stretched. If people discover that the atypical instantiation can be
covered plausibly, then the value may be expanded to include this
instantiation, and its reach as a guiding principle would be signif-
icantly increased. What remains to be discovered is whether or
when atypical instantiations can function in this way. This issue is
particularly salient when addressing atypical forms of discrimina-
tion (e.g., ageist or sizeist issues). Currently, typical forms of
discrimination are often prohibited in legislation, but there is no
specific legislation against less typical forms of discrimination.
Yet some of these less typical forms are very prevalent within
society. For example, research has shown that obese people expe-
rience more employment discrimination than nonobese people
(Rothblum, Brand, Miller, & Oetjen, 1990) and that employers are
unwilling to hire overweight people even if their weight would not
have affected their performance in their job (Roe & Eickwort,
1976). Touster (2000) suggested that fatness is stigmatized in
society and yet oppression of fat people is not viewed as illegiti-
mate oppression (see also Crandall & Biernat, 1990). It is likely
that this view occurs because treatment of overweight versus thin
people is not as often perceived as an issue of equal opportunity
(see McVittie, McKinlay, & Widdicombe, 2003, for a related
discussion of ageism). It may be useful to encourage the contem-
plation of values across diverse situations because the contexts
within which values are actually relevant on a daily basis will not
always correspond to people’s typical instantiations of those val-
ues.
In sum, it is not simply the case that values make decisions
easier. Consistent with the quotation at the beginning, values are
stronger guides for behavior when they are held clearly in mind
than when they are not (Maio et al., 2001). However, the present
research indicates that this guidance is dependent on the salient
instantiation of the value and that people may be entirely unaware
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of the impact that prior value instantiations can have on their own
behavior. This impact of instantiation adds an important caveat to
the overarching role of values as rigid guiding principles. If an
abstract trans-situational guiding principle is used in different
ways depending on its prior instantiation, this severely restricts its
universal nature. The present research makes clear that value
instantiations are vital and unique components of values, distinct
from the existence of values at the higher, abstract level, but
exerting a powerful impact on subsequent value-relevant behavior.
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